Place-based college scholarships, such as the Kalamazoo Promise, provide students who live in a particular place, and/or who attend a particular school district, with generous college scholarships. An important potential benefit from such "Promise programs" is their short-term effects on local economic development. Generous Promise scholarships provide an incentive for families to locate in a particular place, which may change migration patterns, and potentially boost local employment and housing prices. Using data from the American Community Survey, this paper estimates the average effects of eight relatively generous Promise programs on migration rates and housing prices in their local labor market. The paper finds evidence that Promise programs lead to significantly reduced out-migration rates for at least three years after a Promise program is announced. These reductions in out-migration rates are larger for households with children, and are also larger when we focus on smaller areas around the Promise-eligible zone rather than the entire local labor market. These out-migration effects are large, implying that Promise programs lead to a 1.7% increase in overall population of the local labor market. JEL Classification Codes: I22, I25, I28, J61, R23
INTRODUCTION
Place-based college scholarship programs-often called "Promise programs"-have proliferated, with over 50 programs created since the 2005 start of the Kalamazoo Promise (Miller-Adams 2015) . What unifies Promise programs is their targeting by location: college scholarship eligibility is restricted to K-12 graduates who live in a particular place and/or have attended and graduated from a particular school district.
A common goal of Promise programs is local economic development. In the long-term, local economic development may be enhanced by increasing the post-secondary attainment of local students. But local economic development may also be enhanced in the short-term. As soon as Promise programs are announced, parents have an additional reason to move to or remain in Promise communities. An increased local population of school-age families will boost local economic development, by increasing local labor supply and demand for local goods and services. Both increased local labor supply and increased local demand will encourage employers to add local jobs. This theory about short-term economic benefits of Promise programs was apparently believed by the anonymous Kalamazoo Promise donors. According to Dr. Janice Brown, the Kalamazoo Public Schools superintendent who mediated the Kalamazoo Promise's creation, the donors believe that "equal access to higher education for all creates a powerful incentive that will bring people and employers back to Kalamazoo" (Miller-Adams 2009 , p. 7 quoting Boudette 2006 . These short-term effects of Promise programs on local economic development are estimated in the current paper. The paper focuses on eight Promise programs, chosen because they are large enough and generous enough to potentially significantly affect local migration and
The estimated out-migration effects of Promise programs are large. For example, the estimates imply that Promise programs increase the total population of the overall Commuting Zone by almost 2 percent, even though the Promise-eligible area on average only includes oneseventh of the Commuting Zone's population. A 2 percent increase in Commuting Zone population would be predicted to increase the Commuting Zone's housing prices and employment enough to imply sizable benefits relative to scholarship costs.
The next section analyzes what economic development effects would be expected from
Promise programs, based on economic theory. We then review previous empirical research that estimates Promise effects on variables related to local economic development. The estimation model is then summarized, and we discuss how we overcome some estimation challenges.
Following that, we describe this study's data. Estimation results are presented for how Promise programs affect out-migration, in-migration, and housing prices. The conclusion argues that these estimation results imply large effects of Promise programs.
THEORY
Promise programs would be expected to attract households with children. What effect would this attraction have on local economic development? How would this attraction be expected to affect out-migration rates, in-migration rates, and housing prices?
For local economic development to be increased by Promise programs, the direct attraction of households must lead to "spillovers." Spillovers are any indirect effects due to the direct attraction of households with children, such as effects on local employment, households without children, local demand, housing prices, employment rates and wealth. Such spillovers may be positive or negative, either increasing or decreasing local economic development. For example, some spillovers may attract households without children to the local economy, whereas others may repel households without children. Spillover effects on the entire local labor market level are first considered, before considering spillover effects within the local labor market, between the Promise area and the rest of the local labor market. At the local labor market level, attraction of households with children would yield some positive spillovers on local economic development. First, a greater population of households with children would increase local employment, in several ways. Greater labor supply from these households would encourage employers to locate in or expand in the local labor market, by making it easier for employers to find additional workers. A greater population of households with children will increase local demand for goods and services, due to effects on consumption, government services, and investment. The additional households bring with them non-labor income and government assistance that increase demand for local consumption goods and services. Because many intergovernmental aid formulas are based in part on local population, the additional households will lead to increased aid from the federal and state government to local governments, which will increase public services spending.
1 Additional households will also lead to the need for additional housing and infrastructure, which will cause at least a short-term burst of local spending related to housing and infrastructure.
Second, this increase in local employment would also attract households without children. The new jobs in local retailers, local governments, and the local housing sector provide opportunities for all workers.
On the other hand, attracting households with children reduces local economic development with some negative spillovers. The most important negative spillover is the potential for increased housing prices. More population and more employment will increase local housing prices, land prices, and property values. The magnitude of housing price increases (and the interrelated increases in land prices and property values) depends upon how "elastically" local housing supply responds to increased local demand. The local housing supply elasticity will be affected by the availability of properties for new housing development or redevelopment, which will be altered by local geographic features, local zoning rules, and state and local housing codes.
Increased local housing prices will repel some households. This reduction in local labor supply, as well as increased land prices, will have some depressing effects on local employment.
2
The net outcome for local economic development from these positive and negative
spillovers cannot be determined a priori on theoretical grounds. The net outcome depends on empirical factors, such as the elasticity of local housing supply, and how much intergovernmental aid and non-labor income go up due to additional households with children.
These empirical factors vary across diverse local labor markets. However, previous research on local labor markets suggests that, on average, positive spillovers from local population attraction at least match negative spillovers. For example, previous research finds that when local labor markets experience increases in local labor supply due to in-migration, this increased local labor supply is matched by employment growth, with little adverse effects on the labor market fortunes of the local area's original residents (Greenwood and Hunt 1984; Muth 1971) .
How is this analysis altered because Promise programs only target a portion of the local labor market, that is the school district or city that has Promise availability (the Promise "zone")?
This limited Promise coverage of local labor markets does not qualitatively alter overall labor market effects, but may quantitatively reduce the magnitude of local labor market effects, as well as creating some effects within local labor markets. First, tying the Promise award to a smaller geographic area would be expected to reduce the attractive effects of Promise programs, because it ties Promise availability to a more limited set of neighborhood choices and school district choices. Second, the Promise zone would be expected to encourage some geographic redistribution of households with children within the local labor market, from the rest of the local labor market to the Promise zone. This geographic redistribution would put some upward pressure on housing prices in the Promise zone relative to the rest of the local area.
But this geographic redistribution of households with children and housing prices does not mean that there are no overall local labor market effects. For example, if housing supply was perfectly elastic in the rest of the local labor market, then housing prices in the rest of the local labor market would stay the same. Furthermore, we would expect there to be a very elastic supply of households from the rest of the U.S. to this specific local labor market. When households with children are redistributed from the rest of the local labor market to the Promise zone, this opens up housing units in the rest of the local labor market for new households to move into the local labor market (or alternatively, for households to stay who otherwise would have left the local labor market). Both households with children and without children would be attracted to the local labor market. How would the overall attractive effects of Promise programs for households with children, and the subsequent spillover effects, be expected to be manifested over time in inmigration rates, out-migration rates, and housing prices? First, we expect Promise programs to result in a one-time temporary spike in in-migration rates, but in more persistent reductions in out-migration rates. This pattern is expected because most Promise programs make the Promise scholarship more generous the longer a student has been enrolled in the school district.
3 Therefore, for any household with children who is considering moving into a Promise zone, it makes sense to move in as soon as possible, rather than waiting. We would expect to see a onetime increase in in-migration immediately after the Promise announcement, assuming the Promise announcement is understood by households and believed.
On the other hand, Promise programs create persistent incentives for out-migration to be lower. Because of the availability of Promise benefits, households with children have another reason to hesitate before moving out in response to any changes in their personal circumstances (e.g. a new job offer) or due to any dissatisfaction with the Promise-eligible school district. Outmigration rates would be expected to be persistently lower, although perhaps not permanently lower.
This expected pattern of in-migration and out-migration effects is consistent with research evidence on how Promise programs increase Promise school districts' enrollment. For the Kalamazoo Promise, research shows that the Promise resulted in a one-time increase in new students entering the district, in the year just after the Promise announcement, but more persistent reductions in the rate at which students exited the district (Bartik et al. 2010; Hershbein 2013 ).
As for housing prices, Promise programs would be expected to cause some persistent increase in housing price levels. This housing price effect is due to the expected increase in the area's population, and the reality that local housing supply is unlikely to be infinitely elastic with respect to housing prices. The research literature suggests that a 1 percent increase in population increases local housing prices on average by somewhere between 0.5 percent and 1 percent. In addition, we would expect some increase in the relative housing price differential between the Promise zone and the rest of the local labor market.
The timing of the housing price increase depends on public expectations about the Promise program. In theory, if everyone fully believes that an announced Promise program would be fully implemented and would last, housing prices should immediately increase after the program's announcement. If a Promise program's funding and implementation is more uncertain, housing prices may only gradually increase, as the public sees that scholarships are actually awarded.
REVIEW OF RELEVANT PROMISE RESEARCH LITERATURE
A growing research literature on Promise programs estimates a wide variety of program effects, including effects on student success in high school and college (Bartik and Lachowska 2013; Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 2015) . But for this paper, this review section focuses on narrower Promise effects, those more directly related to short-run local economic development. is very elastic in the rest of the local area), then the overall area housing price effect would obviously be the Promise zone effect times the proportion of the area in the Promise zone.
ESTIMATION MODEL AND ISSUES
In the current study, Promise program effects are examined using panel data. These panel data are on a cross section of local areas, observed over different years, for which we have annual observations. The dependent variables are means for area/year cells for migration rate and housing price variables. The local areas in the sample include some areas with Promise zones, along with matched comparison areas. The years examined include years before the Promise announcement, and years after the Promise announcement. The estimation model seeks to determine how migration rates and housing prices varied before and after the Promise announcement, relative to matched comparison communities, and controlling both for area fixed effects and year fixed effects.
The underlying data on migration rates and housing prices come from the American Community Survey, all years from [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] . The data sources and derivations will be described in more detail in the next section.
The estimation model can be written as:
(1)
The areas are indexed by i. The areas considered are in one set of estimations, "Commuting Zones," which are local labor market areas, to be discussed further below. In another set of estimations, the areas considered are "Migration Public Use Microdata Areas," or "Migration
PUMAs," which are smaller areas, created by the Census, that are the smallest geographic unit for which it is possible in public use data to determine in and out-migration rates. The years are indexed by t. The dependent variables Y it are in-migration rates, out-migration rates, and the natural logarithm of housing prices. The migration rates are the migration rates from last year to this year, and represent the rate of in-migration or out-migration into or out of this area, as a percent of the relevant group's population in the area (either this year's population for inmigration, or last year's population for out-migration). Migration rates are calculated both for the population in all households and for the population in households that include at least one child under age 18.
The right-hand side of the equation includes a constant term, B 0 , as well as two sets of fixed effects, a set of fixed effects for each area i (F i ), and a set of fixed effects for year t (F t ).
The model also includes a disturbance term, ε it .
On the right hand side, the main policy variables of interest are a complete set of A key econometric challenge of this estimation approach is that the number of Promise programs in the estimation is small. Research on panel data estimation suggests that if the number of treatment areas is small, the usual t-statistics for the treatment effects may be misleading, because they will overstate the statistical significance of the estimated treatment effects. The intuition is that the usual calculated t-statistics will actually only follow the usual tdistribution asymptotically, as the number of treatment groups approaches infinity. In a sample in which the number of treatment groups is "small," unobserved time-varying shocks to the treatment units, shocks that possibly will be correlated over time, can lead to large estimated treatment effects that are not as unlikely in a finite sample as the calculated t-statistics suggests.
Based on analyses by Conley and Taber (2011) , this problem is particularly severe if the number of treatment groups is only one or two. However, some over-statement of statistical significance occurs when there are only 10 treatment areas.
In this paper's model, some of the far leads and lags for Promise zone effects on the overall area essentially only have one or two treatment areas that are identifying the treatment effect, as not all of the eight Promise areas were early or late enough for data to be available the appropriate number of years before or after the Promise announcement. For the Promise effects in the year of Promise announcement, and one or two years after, we have eight areas with Promise zones that are identifying the Promise effects at that time interval.
To help identify the appropriate statistical inferences from the estimates, we rely on a methodology recently proposed by MacKinnon and Webb (2015) . A similar approach has been used by Conti, Heckman, and Pinto (2015) . The basic idea is the following: randomly exchange treatment areas for comparison areas, recover the t-statistics from this random reassignment, repeat this process many times, and then see what the distribution of t-statistics is in these randomly assigned treatment group samples. The actual t-statistic in the original model with the real treatment areas is compared with the t-statistic distribution in these many randomly reassigned treatment status models, and it is seen how probable it would be to see a t-statistic of that absolute value. Using this imaginary reassignment of treatment status to eight areas, areas that in the real world are NOT Promise areas, and the assignment of comparison area status to the other areas, including the true Promise areas, the model is re-estimated. The t-statistics on all the Promise dummies for various leads and lags are recovered from this re-estimate. Under the null hypothesis that the true treatment has no effect, the effect of this imaginary reassignment of treatment status should be zero, for all leads and lags on the Promise dummies. The t-statistic on a given Promise lead or lag dummy from this re-estimation using "fake" treatment assignment is one draw from the t-statistic produced in this model, under the null hypothesis that the true treatment effect is zero. This imaginary reassignment of eight treatment areas is done 10,000 times, each time randomly changing which eight areas are chosen to be regarded as imaginary treatment areas. T-statistics for all leads and lags on the Promise dummies are recovered from each of these 10,000 estimations. For each Promise lead or lag dummy, the distribution of these 10,000 t-statistics represents the true distribution of the t-statistics of this model with a small number of treatment groups, with the effective number of treatment groups varying with the lead or lag, under the null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero. For each of the Promise leads and lags in the original true model, we look at the estimate's t-statistic. For that t-statistic, an inference of its probability can be derived by seeing what the probability would be of a t-statistic of that absolute size in the 10,000 fake estimates.
Figures 1 and 2 provide illustrations of the results from such resimulations. Figure 1 shows the actual distribution of t-statistics from the 10,000 simulations for the dummy variable for eight years after the Promise announcement, for the Commuting Zone regression where the dependent variable is the out-migration rate for the population in households with children under
18. This estimate is only identified by one treatment area, and in fact by an observation on one area/year cell, as we don't have information on eight years after the Promise announcement for seven of the eight Promise areas. The actual distribution of t-statistics in the 10,000 random simulations is compared with a standard normal distribution, which is the distribution we would expect a t-distribution with so many nominal degrees of freedom to approximately follow. As can be seen, the actual distribution of t-statistics does not resemble the standard normal distribution. The simulated probability of having t-stats greater than 5 in absolute value is far greater than would be predicted based on the standard normal distribution.
Figure 2 provides a contrast. This figure also shows the actual distribution of t-statistics from 10,000 random resimulations of the model with fake treatment areas, but this time the tstatistics are for the dummy for one year after the Promise announcement, again for the Commuting Zone regression where the dependent variable is the out-migration rate for the population in households with children under age 18. This dummy is identified from the experience of eight treatment areas for which we have such data for one year after the Promise announcement. In this case, the match between the simulated t-statistic distribution, and the standard normal distribution, is much closer. The tails are a bit thicker than the standard normal, but the difference is obviously not nearly as great as for the previous figure, which rested on only one treatment area.
As a result, the usual t-tail probabilities are likely to be most seriously misleading for the far leads and lags, whose estimation rests on fewer treatment areas. However, in the later reported estimates, we correct all the two-tail probabilities for this bias due to having a finite number of treatment areas. The corrected two-tail probabilities, based on the distribution of tstatistics inferred from 10,000 simulations, will give improved statistical inference for whether a particular coefficient on a treatment dummy lead or lag is significantly different from zero. Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) are Census-designated geographic areas, with a minimum population of 100,000 and usually not many more than a population of 100,000, which are the smallest area for which the Census Bureau will in public-use microdata bases identify a household's geographic location. Migration PUMAs are one or more contiguous PUMAs that, for households that move, are the smallest geographic area for which in public-use microdata the Census will report the geographic location the previous year. In other words, the Census sometimes provides less geographic detail on location the previous year than on location the current year.
DATA
The correspond to the migrant numerator, e.g., the overall population is used when looking at all migrants, and the population in households with children under age 18 is used when looking at migrants in such households.
The calculation of these population statistics involves using the Census-assigned PUMAs to allocate mover locations, but in the real world shorter moves are more likely. We tried this procedure, and saw in practice that reassigning new PUMAs to old PUMAs artificially pushed up Migration PUMA migration rates above previous rates using the old definitions, or above current rates using the new PUMA definitions.
with a simple average of 30 percent. As a percent of the surrounding Commuting Zone, the Promise areas range from 4 percent to 32 percent, with a simple average of 14 percent.
As mentioned previously, and as shown in As can be seen in Table 3 , Panel 3A, the matching significantly reduces the differences between the Promise Commuting Zones and the matched Commuting Zones, compared to all other Commuting Zones. In particular, the matched areas are made more similar to Promise areas by choosing areas with lower historical migration rates, somewhat larger size, and somewhat lower prior employment growth. The average absolute value of the t-statistic of the difference between Promise areas and matched areas, versus Promise areas and all other areas, is reduced by three-fourths, from an average t-statistic absolute value of a little over four to an average 12 Because of the way that the Census reports migration data in the 2000 PUMS, the migration rates are five-year migration rates, which obviously are not exactly the same as the one-year migration rate dependent variables in the estimated regressions. absolute value of t-statistics of a little under one. The average of the normalized differences between variables, a measure advocated by Imbens (2014) , is reduced by two-thirds. 13 The Promise Commuting Zones still tend to be somewhat larger areas, with somewhat lower historical growth, and lower in-migration rates and out-migration rates. These remaining differences are controlled for with Commuting Zone fixed effects. In addition, in interpreting the results, we will examine the pattern of the pre-and post-Promise announcement dummies and see whether there are signs of pre-existing trends.
Panel 3B shows the Migration PUMA matching. In this case, the original set of all other Migration PUMAs is not so drastically different from the Migration PUMAs with Promise areas.
Therefore, the scope of the matching for lowering pre-existing differentials is narrowed, and the matching doesn't make as much difference to these Migration PUMA-specific variables.
However, because this Migration PUMA matching takes place within the matched Commuting Zones, we know the matched Migration PUMAs will also have similar Commuting Zone characteristics to the Promise areas.
The regressions are done using the matched datasets. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the matched databases for the dependent variables. The descriptive statistics seem reasonable. As shown in Table 4 , in-and out-migration rates tend to average around 4 percent. There is a fair amount of variation in the sample in migration rates and housing prices.
For example, looking at the 10th and 90th percentile of the distributions, migration rates vary by a factor of 2-to-1 to 3-to-1. Similar variation occurs for housing prices.
RESULTS
This section will present the results, grouped by whether the dependent variable is an outmigration rate, an in-migration rate, or housing prices. As discussed above, if Promise programs have effects, we expect them to be most persistent for out-migration and housing prices, and stronger for Migration PUMAs than Commuting Zones, and for households with children than for all households.
Out-migration
To summarize the results for out-migration, the out-migration estimates suggest that Promise programs persistently cause out-migration rates to decline, for at least three years after a Promise program is announced. This inference is supported by the out-migration results' pattern across different groups.
As shown in Table 5 , after the Promise program's announcement, there are some statistically significant effects for one or more years in causing out-migration for all groups to decline. (Statistical significance is judged by a 10 percent test, using the simulated 2-tail probabilities for the estimated t-statistics.) These negative out-migration effects of Promise programs are stronger for the Migration PUMA area that is more immediately around the Promise zone, than it is for the larger Commuting Zone. Negative out-migration effects of Promise programs are also strongest for the population in households with children, compared to the overall population.
If we look at out-migration's time pattern of Promise effects, before and after the announcement (Table 5 and Figure 3) , there is no pre-existing trend prior to the Promise announcement towards reduced out-migration. If anything, the estimates suggest that in Migration PUMAs surrounding Promise programs, the pre-existing trend might have been towards out-migration increasing. Perhaps increased out-migration around Promise areas might be part of why some areas have adopted Promise programs, as a response that aims to reverse this increased out-migration trend. If so, the empirical evidence suggests that Promise programs in fact do reverse the pre-existing trend towards increased out-migration, and lead to some sustained reduction in out-migration.
Summing-up over the three years after a Promise announcement, the estimates suggest Promise program effects on out-migration that are sizable enough to yield substantively large effects on an area's population. For example, the cumulative effect on out-migration over these three years is sufficient to increase overall Commuting Zone population by 1.7 percent and population in the Migration PUMA by 2.7 percent. For households with children, the implied population effect summed over three years is even larger, increasing the population of households with children by 2.5 percent in the overall Commuting Zone and 6.0 percent for the Migration PUMA.
The average population share of Migration PUMAs in the overall Commuting Zone, and of households with children in the overall population, can be used to look at the population of different groups, both with and without children, and inside and outside the Migration PUMA immediately around the Promise program. These calculations are reported in Table 6 .
As shown in Table 6 , over the entire Commuting Zone, positive spillovers seem to predominate for households without children. The direct effects of Promise programs in reducing out-migration for households with children are accompanied by some reductions of outmigration for households without children, although at a lesser rate than for households with children. Within the Commuting Zone, the out-migration estimates imply that Promise programs redistribute households with children so that more of them live within the surrounding Migration PUMA, and fewer live outside the surrounding Migration PUMA. However, on net the overall Commuting Zone population of households with children increases. Furthermore, the reduced population of households with children in the "remainder of the Commuting Zone"-that area outside the Migration PUMA surrounding the Promise area-is more than offset by increases in this remainder area for the population of households without children. Even in the Migration PUMA immediately around the Promise program, the estimates imply that Promise programs lead to some increase in population not only for households with children but for households without children.
In-Migration
Overall, the in-migration results do not provide much support for effects of Promise programs. In the year of the Promise announcement, positive in-migration effects are found, relative to the year before the Promise announcement, for the overall Commuting Zone.
However, in-migration effects are not found for the Migration PUMA immediately around the Promise program, where one would expect any true in-migration effects to be larger.
Furthermore, in-migration effects move up and down with not much of a clear sustained pattern, both before and after the Promise announcement. This is shown not only in Table 7 , but in Figure 4 . From looking at Figure 4 , speculation might imagine that prior to the Promise announcement, there was a more pronounced tendency for declining in-migration, which seems during the post-Promise period to be stabilized. But these estimates are too imprecise to allow for firm conclusions.
Housing Prices
Pre-existing trends make it difficult to conclude anything definitive about how Promise programs affect housing prices. As shown in Table 8 , the estimates for Migration PUMAs suggest a statistically significant and large effect of Promise programs on housing prices, as of four years after the Promise programs' announcement. However, Table 8 and Figure 5 also show that housing prices in Migration PUMAs were trending already, prior to the Promise program announcement. There is no sign that the Promise announcement led to this upward trend accelerating. For Commuting Zone housing prices, pre-existing trends are less evident, and the point estimates suggest that after the Promise program announcement, housing prices increased.
However, none of the Commuting Zone housing price estimates are close to being statistically significant. The housing price estimates are noisy enough that even large effects are not statistically distinguishable from zero.
CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed the effects of place-based scholarship programs on outmigration, in-migration, and housing prices. The results suggest that these "Promise" programs have significant and sustained effects in reducing out-migration, and thereby increase a local area's population. These out-migration reduction effects are particularly concentrated among households with children, and in the areas that surround the Promise program. In contrast, this paper's results provide no strong evidence for or against Promise program effects in increasing in-migration or housing prices.
These estimated out-migration effects of Promise programs are substantively large, in that they are of sufficient magnitude to make a difference to Promise program's benefits versus costs. For example, the annual scholarship costs of the Kalamazoo Promise are around $11 million. The estimates here suggest that Promise programs might increase the population of a local area such as Kalamazoo by about 1.7 percent. The previous research literature suggests that an increase in a local area's population by 1 percent might increase local housing prices by 0.6 percent (Bartik 1991) . Therefore, we might expect the reduced out-migration due to a Promise program to increase housing prices in Kalamazoo County by 1 percent. Such an increase would be perfectly consistent with the direct estimates of housing price effects in the current paper, as these estimates are imprecise. 1751_2228_21957_45818---,00.html. We include all property in our calculations.) This is insufficient to allow the increased property taxes on these increased property values to finance the Kalamazoo Promise's cost. There is no miracle public service version of a Laffer curve here.
However, the increased property wealth of $168 million is of similar present value to the present value of $11 million in annual costs. For example, at a social discount rate of 3 percent, $11 million in annual costs has a present value of around $367 million. Therefore, the property value increases alone due to the Kalamazoo Promise might be over 45 percent of the program's costs.
And a complete benefit-cost analysis would obviously consider other benefits, such as the increased earnings of any increased educational attainment due to Promise programs (Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 2015) . A 1.7 percent boost to local population might also be expected to lead to a local employment increase of similar size. This expectation is based on research literature suggesting that shocks to local population from migration do not significantly affect local employment to population ratios or wages (Greenwood and Hunt 1984; Muth 1971) . For Kalamazoo County, this would correspond to the creation of about 1,900 permanent jobs. The annual cost per jobyear would then be around $6,000 (= $11 million / 1,900). This compares quite favorably with many economic development incentives, which often will have annual costs per job-year created that might average around $20,000 (Bartik 2016) . Therefore, from an economic development perspective, Promise programs might be reasonably cost-effective ways of creating local jobs.
The main limitation of this study is its imprecision. Because currently there are only relatively few Promise programs that are sufficiently generous and have a sufficient number of post-Promise years to allow for estimation, this study's estimates are necessarily imprecise. If
Promise programs continue to spread around the U.S., future research may be able to pin down their local effects with more precision. In addition, future research may have a sufficient sample size to allow for analysis of how Promise program effects vary with program design. NOTE: These are estimates where the dependent variable is the out-migration variable for the population in households with children under age 18 for the Commuting Zone. The reported t-statistics are for the 8th lead, that is for the dummy variable for eight years after the Promise announcement. This is essentially identified by only one treatment area, that is from the group of comparison areas for Kalamazoo. NOTE: "Universal" refers to not-targeted based on merit or need, although all are targeted based on location and usually on length of residence at location. All programs are "expansive" in that many colleges trigger eligibility for assistance, which is not always the case for Promise-style programs. Also, as noted, all programs pay amounts that are likely to be large percentages of tuition for up to 4 years. Model is derived from regression of out-migration rate from last year to this year for this geographic unit and population group, which is explained by geographic dummy fixed effects, year fixed effects, predicted employment growth from last year to this year based on CZ industry mix and national industry growth (for Commuting Zone models only), and set of dummies equal to one for year relative to Promise announcement. Estimated effects are bolded when the probability of a t-statistic of that size, from the 10,000 simulations of the model, is less than 10%. Table 5 , and simply sum these three years of effects. The remaining effects are derived from some simple averages of relationships between population sizes of various groups in the sample. Specifically, the simple average over all eight Promise programs included in this study are as follows: 56.93% of the CZ's population is in the Migration PUMA; 40.73% of the CZ's population is in households with children less than 18 years of age; 40.97% of the Migration PUMA's population is in households with children less than 18. From this, one can derive the percentage of the sample in all these various subgroups. This is used to calculate the non-bolded numbers in Panel 6A, and the numbers in Panel 6B. Specifically, Panel 6B is derived by dividing the percentage effect by what proportion each sub-group is of the overall CZ population; interested readers can reverse the process to get these proportions. Model is derived from regression of in-migration rate from last year to this year for this geographic unit and population group, which is explained by geographic dummy fixed effects, year fixed effects, predicted employment growth from last year to this year based on CZ industry mix and national industry growth (for Commuting Zone models only), and set of dummies equal to one for year relative to Promise announcement. Estimated effects are bolded when the probability of a t-statistic of that size, from the 10,000 simulations of the model, is less than 10%. Model is derived from regression of ln(home value) for this year for this geographic unit, which is explained by geographic dummy fixed effects, year fixed effects, predicted logarithmic employment level for this year based on CZ industry mix in 2000 and national industry growth (for Commuting Zone models only), and set of dummies equal to one for year relative to Promise announcement. Estimated effects are bolded when the probability of a t-statistic of that size, from the 10,000 simulations of the model, is less than 10%.
